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Abstract
For a long time, rural land transfer in China has been 
facing with irrational profit distribution phenomenon 
among various subjects. Peasants suffer profit violation 
in terms of transfer income distribution. This paper 
concludes research status of land transfer and analyzes 
current situation of transfer income distribution in current 
stage and the problems. Finally, solutions to rational 
distribution of transfer income are proposed. 
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INTRODUCTION
Three agriculture-related issues have been fundamental 
issues in Chinese social development process. Land issue 
is the priority among three agriculture-related issues. The 
success of land reform concerns stability of the whole 
rural society. China has been facing with serious situation 
of city-countryside dual structure in land system. To solve 
such problem, the state has carried out a series of reforms. 
One of the most important reforms is land transfer 
problem. However, for a long term, land transfer income 
distribution shows significant irrationality, and the right of 
peasants as landowners are damaged. The Third Plenary 
Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China proposes rural collective operation and 
construction land which complies with planning and 
purpose control conditions are allowed to enter the market 
and equally enter non-agricultural land market with state-
owned land to form an open transaction platform with 
equal rights and uniform rules and establish land price 
system under uniform land market. This also aims to 
solve peasants’ income distribution in rural collective 
land transfer. Land income should incline to peasants. It 
thus can be seen that studying income distribution in rural 
collective land transfer has strong practical significance.
1.   RESEARCH STATUS OF LAND 
TRANSFER PROFIT DISTRIBUTION
1.1  Concept of Land Transfer
Land transfer refers to the behavior of the subject of 
right who transfers land right completely or partly to 
other subjects, i.e. land right transfer. According to 
different rights transferred, rural land transfer is classified 
into ownership transfer and use right transfer. Rural 
land ownership transfer means collective economic 
organization transfers land ownership to the state or other 
economic organizations. The major forms include state 
expropriation and land ownership exchange etc. Land 
use right transfer means peasant households owning 
contractual right of land transfer land management right 
(use right) to other peasants or economic organizations, i.e. 
retain contracting right and transfer the use right.
1.2  Domestic and Overseas Researches on Land 
Transfer Income Distribution 
Speaking of land transfer income, land property right must 
be specified. Land resource is a special natural resource, 
and many different opinions on definition of its property 
right exist. Foreign scholars consider land property right 
is the product of contesting process of interest groups. U. 
Alston and J. Umbeek consider property right definition 
owns political nature, coerciveness and unfairness. 
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Domestic scholar Zhou (2006) believed “land property 
right is the sum of a series of rights on land property right 
on the basis of land ownership”. For the moment, Chinese 
land is classified into national ownership and collective 
ownership, but the actual right is often reflected in actual 
user. Hence, definition of property right between the 
government and collective owners influences income 
distribution among subjects.
With regard to income distribution in rural land 
transfer process, scholars have great controversies which 
mainly concentrate on whether the government should 
directly participate in income distribution process and 
what the proportion is. Lv and Yang (2005) held that 
construction of national infrastructure to a large extent 
decides the value of collective construction land in 
cities and towns, and that a part of income gained in 
transfer should be brought by the investment of national 
infrastructure construction; the state should participate in 
transfer income distribution. But more scholars consider 
the government should not become distribution subject of 
transfer income. Cheng (2002) believed the distribution 
relationship among government, collective landowners 
and actual operators should be specified, but most income 
should be owned by the later two. Wang, He and Gao 
(2006) indicated compensation for land acquisition is 
too low, compared with land supply price and increment 
benefit. Compensation standard for land acquisition in 
China is too low and does not comply with science. As 
per existing standard, compensation for land acquisition 
should be executed according to 15-30 times of average 
income for the original purpose in recent 3 years. Such 
standard as per original purpose is difficult to reflect real 
use value of land. This obviously damages the interest of 
landowners. Wang, Hong and Peng (2009) as well as Yue 
and Lei (2005) believed that, government investment in 
infrastructure construction is its responsibility; to ensure 
fairness, the government can indirectly participate in 
transfer income distribution through tax collection. Lv and 
Jin (2012) considered land increment interest relationship 
is new legal relationship of interest adjustment of market 
subjects for “economic surplus right” distribution and 
realization and should be adjusted by economic law. 
2.  FORM AND SUBJECT OF LAND 
TRANSFER INCOME
Land transfer means the land owner lose the manage 
right of the land, its survival and income must be 
subjected to certain influence, therefore, must give certain 
compensation to the transferor, the common compensation 
form include: land compensation fee, resettlement 
compensation fee, crops compensation fee, attachment 
of the ground compensation fee, all these are given to 
farmers one-time; also, farmland occupation tax, land 
reclamation fee, land acquisition management fee, for the 
use of state-owned land compensation fee and the transfer 
land value-added tax and other additional fees, these costs 
are the tax and land transfer income which gathered by the 
government in the process of land acquisition and transfer.
The transfer income of rural collective land is often 
distributed among the local governments at all levels, the 
collective owners, farmers and agricultural enterprises. 
The collective ownership and the farmers’ interests are 
unified, so it can be classified as a subject, which could be 
called the subject of the farmers.
The government includes local people’s governments 
at various levels, the main goal of this subject is to 
develop the local economy, improve performance. On 
the one hand, attract bid for inviting investments through 
the land, project development and so on, easily caused 
excessive land acquisition suspect; on the other hand, by 
raising the price of land to increase tax revenues and thus 
increase local financial revenue. Not only that, the local 
government often through driving down land transfer fee 
and other compensation costs artificially to increase the 
proportion of its transfer income distribution.
Another subject is the large peasant household. The 
purpose of the transfer of land is very clear, by means of 
fighting for the corresponding compensation to ensure the 
compensation for the transfer of land use right to ensure 
their survival and improve the living standards.
The third distribution subject is agricultural enterprises. 
The aim is to realize the maximum benefits of their own 
through concentrating on the available land to achieve 
large-scale production.
The transfer income distribution subject will 
inevitably start the game around the land issue. The game 
relationship of the three parts is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
In reality, the target of these three main Distribution 
subjects often conflict, especially in the areas where land 
is more dependent. For the government and farmers, the 
government often reduces the farmers’ transfer income 
distribution in order to increase financial income. There is 
also a game between agricultural enterprises and farmers, 
often performs driving down the price of the land with 
the help of the government, or in the contract signing and 
performing in having affection and faith. In the reality, the 
farmers are often in a disadvantageous position because of 
their own knowledge structure or information asymmetry, 
once this reasonable claim of rights and demands are not 
satisfied, it is likely to lead disputes or other social issues.
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(Improve performance,  
protect land and interests) 
 
 
Study on Peasants’ Profit Distribution in Land Transfer
66Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
3.  PROBLEMS IN LAND TRANSFER 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN CURRENT 
STAGE 
3.1  Property Right Subject is Not Fully Defined 
Clear property right decides whether clear definition 
of property right can operate normally. Chinese laws 
explicitly stipulate that rural land is owned by collectivity, 
and the subject of property right is explicit, but laws 
do not make a clear explanation of the implication of 
collectivity. Collectivity includes village collectivity, 
collective economic organization and town collectivity 
etc. In reality, various places are based on policies. 
Thus, in most cases, actual holders of property right are 
administrative staffs, while peasants become the people 
without actual right. Secondly, land rights and interests are 
undefined. Real right attribute of contractual right of land 
and obligatory right attribute of land use right transfer 
contract are vague. Finally, the nature of land contracting 
right is not defined by laws, but through policies. 
3.2  Peasants’ Rights are Not Respected and 
Protected
In the first round of land contracting agreement, central 
documents explicitly indicate the use right of contracted 
land belongs to peasants and the contracting period is 
15 years. In the second round of contracting agreement, 
the contracting period is 30 years and even the articles 
promise there is no need of changes after 30 years. The 
Third plenary Session of the 17th CPC National Congress 
further pointed out in the Decision of Some Importance 
Issues of CPC Central Committee on Promoting Rural 
Reform and Development, peasants should be given 
sufficient and guaranteed land contracting operation right, 
and existing land contracting relationship should keep 
stable and “unchanged for a long time”. This means land 
contractors have independent decision-making power on 
land use right transfer. The decision making right about 
whether land use right is transferred and how to transfer is 
owned by peasants. The subjects of rural land use right are 
peasants anytime. But for a long term, peasants’ right to 
use ad dispose land cannot be guaranteed. In land transfer 
and expropriation process, peasants are forced to receive 
irrational transfer and subsidy, and peasants’ will is not 
respected. The government owns the right of compulsory 
land acquisition and monopolizes primary market of land. 
The government often compulsorily confiscates land in 
order to achieve tax benefit and promotion objective, and 
thus conflicts with peasants’ benefits. 
3.3  The Government Monopolizes Primary 
Market of Land
In primary market of land, the government is land 
boss. This has great difference with other countries and 
regions. The state not just controls land, but also directly 
participates in operation. In the past 10 years, China 
regarded land as a tool and level. Huge achievements 
gained today can be partly concluded into government’s 
effective exertion of the functions of land. So, it is also 
called in land finance. Many scholars appeal to protect 
peasants’ rights and interests in land transfer. In fact, 
this is not achieved due to mighty government. The 
government is always the sole buyer in land transfer 
process. Actually, this behavior is land expropriation. 
Although central government issues relevant policies 
to restrict land acquisition scope and relevant rights of 
local governments, the status of peasants and government 
in land transfer process still has a huge gap. The key to 
problems and the key to reform are the government. The 
largest obstacle may be the government. 
3.4  Land Acquisition Subsidy Standard is Too 
Low
As per current provisions, compensation standard of 
land acquisition is several times of annual yield of 
land. The compensation standard cannot really reflect 
land use value, let alone be connected with damages to 
peasant’s rights and interests. Meanwhile, peasants do 
not directly involve in formulation of compensation and 
settlement fees. This process is generally executed by 
rural economic organization. Since the information of 
settlement fees cannot be mastered in the first time, many 
lower settlement fees. Thus, the settlement fees gained 
by peasants are very few. According to the data of land 
association, land property right loss of landless peasants 
in China will reach at least 3 billion annually due to 
irrational compensation.  
3.5  Operation Procedure is Non-standard
At present, rural land transfer operation in China is not 
standard. For land operation in many places, the contract 
is signed by village or town organization. Some local 
governments do not strictly make external invitation for 
bids open in land expropriation process, and black box 
in operation exists. In the face of government integrating 
executive power and economic power, peasants lacking 
guarantee are difficult to contend against the government, 
even if they know the operation is not standard and 
transparent. They have to accept interest loss.  
4 .   C O U N T E R M E A S U R E S  A N D 
S U G G E S T I O N S  O N  R A T I O N A L 
DISTRIBUTION LAND INCOME 
4.1  Further Detail Land Property Right
To ensure effective operation of land transfer, it is crucial 
to fully detail the connotation of subject of land property 
right. Further explanation of collective ownership 
should be given from legal perspective. The concept of 
rural collectivity should be explicit. Collectivity is rural 
collective economic organization, i.e. village group. 
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Collective ownership is jointly owned by collective 
members. Land right which collective members enjoy and 
cannot be separated from their identity is co-ownership. 
All village collective economic organization members 
have the right to gain land. Collective land use right and 
disposal right are co-owned by all collective members, 
and consensus should be gained from all villagers. Only 
when peasants’ actual land user identity is ensured can 
peasants achieve the objective of increasing income and 
develop rural economy in land transfer process; only 
when contracting right is stable can peasants may improve 
the expectation of contracted land use value.
4.2  Land Transfer Must be Based on Respecting 
Peasants’ Rights and Interests
Peasant households as subject status of land use right 
transfer should be respected and protected by the 
government and society. The government cannot dispose 
land according to its own will. Peasants have the right to 
decide whether the land is transferred, the transfer mode, 
the price and whom the land is transferred to within the 
scope of laws and government’s rules. The government’s 
functions in land use right transfer include guidance, 
service and supervision. It is required to firmly prohibit 
forcing peasants to carry out transfer on the excuse 
of collective organization as landowner or agriculture 
industrialization. Only in this way, peasants’ interests will 
not be damaged. 
4.3  Establish Rural Collective Land Joint-Stock 
System
Land stock cooperative concentrates dispersive rural 
land in share form and independently operates the land 
concentrated in transfer in the name of cooperative. But 
the cooperative can control land use, make sure peasants’ 
operation right and decision-making right are controlled 
partly, ensure land use and management and achieve scale 
operation. In cooperative, after members share profit 
according to shares, except rental income of contracted 
land, there is also secondary distribution income gained 
from land transfer and operation. This contributes to 
increasing peasants’ land income. Land stock cooperative 
is beneficial to reducing land contracting and operation 
right transfer risk, ensuring rights and interests of 
peasants’ land contracting and operation right and further 
promoting agricultural scale operation and modern 
agricultural development.
4.4  Standardize Land Transfer Procedure 
Currently, there is still lack of normative land transfer 
procedure in China. Land transfer in many places is 
decided privately by the government. Due to competitions 
among each government, these subjects often choose 
reduction of prices competitively and even sell to 
competition unit at a low price. Such operation procedure 
has low efficiency, damages peasants’ vital interests 
and results in asset loss of rural collective economic 
organization. Hence, we need to standardize land transfer 
operation procedure, and adopt the principle of abidance 
by laws, free will and compensation in transfer behavior 
to avoid compulsory land acquisition, standardize transfer 
contract content, standardize transfer market, establish a 
uniform land price market for rural land and urban land 
and promote uniform transaction platform (Zheng, 2009).  
4.5  Transform Governmental Duties and 
Positioning 
The government’s aim is to facilitate rural urbanization 
construction, promote agricultural development and 
guarantee peasants’ rights and interests. The solution to 
land reform is that the government should quit monopoly 
and land operation market, and should no longer play 
the role of a merchant and occupy cultivated land at 
random. Only when interest relationship is eliminated 
and the government has no interests can peasants’ land 
ownership can be really respected. Peasants’ rights should 
be dominated by peasants. But, necessary guidance and 
supervision of land transfer market should be conducted 
to make sure peasants’ rights and interests in land transfer 
process are not damaged, correct and manage illegal 
behaviors in land transfer process and ensure effective 
implementation of land transfer. In the process of 
supervising land transfer process, the government should 
give play to its advantage to reduce information cost and 
even apply financial strength to ensure correct pricing 
of land. On the other hand, the government should use 
administrative power as little as possible to artificially get 
involved in land transfer. In terms of profit distribution, 
the government may properly increase financial income 
through collecting corresponding tax, rather than directly 
involving in income distribution. Secondly, profit 
distribution process of collective economic organization 
and peasants should be supervised to ensure rationality 
of transfer income distribution (Wang & Yu, 2013). In 
particular, peasants’ income should be prevented from 
being damaged in collective economic organization or 
agricultural enterprises. In one word, the government 
should give a role of night watchman and supervisor. 
CONCLUSION 
The success of land reform concerns stability of the whole 
rural society. China has been faced with serious situation 
of city-countryside dual structure in land system. To solve 
such problem, the state has carried out a series of reforms. 
This aims to solve peasants’ income distribution in rural 
collective land transfer.
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